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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This

is an

appeal

from

the

District

petition for post conviction relief.

Court's

denial

Ann.

a

The Utah Supreme Court had

jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2
1993).

of

(Supp.

Jurisdiction was transferred to this Court under Utah Code

§78-2-2(4)

(Supp. 1993).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did

the

trial

court

commit

error

by

holding

that

the

Petitioners failed to prove they would have insisted upon going to
trial but for their counsels' errors?
' Did

the

trial

court

Petitioners

failed

to

meet

demonstrate

ineffective

commit
the

error

by

prejudice

assistance

of

holding

prong

counsel,

that

necessary
as

stated

the
to
in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674

(1984) and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88

L.Ed.2d 203

(1985)?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In deciding the issues presented on appeal, this Court owes no
deference

to

the

trial

court's

legal

conclusions.

The

trial

court's factual findings shall not be set aside on appeal unless
clearly

erroneous.

Ineffective

assistance

present mixed questions of law and fact.
P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1994).
1

of

counsel

claims

Parsons v. Barnes, 871

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution;
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution;
Article I, Sections Seven and Twelve of the Utah Constitution;
Utah Code Ann. §77-32-3 (1953, as amended);
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203 (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Petitioners, Dean K. Hickman and Rick K. Hickman, brought
this case by filing a Petition for Post Conviction Relief on April
10, 1992.

The Petitioners seek to have their guilty pleas to

aggravated robbery withdrawn and convictions set aside. (R. at 007)
The Petitioners assert they were denied the effective assistance of
counsel when they entered their pleas and their pleas were not
voluntary, but were coerced in violation of the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article I, Sections Seven and Twelve
of the Utah Constitution. (R. at 004-007).
To

support

their

claims,

the

Petitioners

alleged

their

attorneys were constitutionally ineffective because they did not
engage in discovery and participated in an impromptu meeting with
a detective for the Salt Lake City Police Department in which plea
negotiations occurred and threats were made. The Petitioners claim
that counsels' conduct caused them to plead guilty and that absent
counsels' conduct, they would not have entered their pleas.

(R. at

004-007) . Finally, the Petitioners claim counsel improperly failed
to assist in motions to withdraw their pleas and in an appeal.
2

An evidentiary hearing for the Petition came before the
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup on July 27 and 28, 1993.
283).

(R. at 175-

The Petitioners presented expert testimony to establish the

standard for reasonableness of representation for counsel, called
Boyd Hickman, their brother, and testified themselves.
187, 187-194, 209-258, respectively).
a

deposition

from

Brooke

Wells

(R. at 180-

The Respondents introduced

(Defendants'

Exhibit

1), the

attorney appointed to represent Mr. Dean Hickman in the criminal
case (R. at 195) , and elicited testimony from Manny Garcia, the
attorney appointed to represent Mr. Rick Hickman in the criminal
case (R. at 197-205) . The Respondents also elicited testimony from
two other fact witnesses (R. at 259-268).
The Petitioners claim that their counsel did not provide
reasonable representation.

The court files in the Petitioners'

criminal cases showed their counsel did not file a formal discovery
demand.

The Petitioners' attorneys' files showed that "some"

documents were made available to Mr. Dean Hickman's counsel.

The

documents were never shown to the Petitioners and they were not
aware of their content.

It was not until the discovery in this

case that the Petitioners learned the two key witnesses for the
State were allegedly co-conspirators
lacked credibility).

(whose testimony obviously

The Petitioners testified that they would

have gone to trial had they been aware of this discovery.
The Petitioners also claim their guilty pleas were the product
of a critical meeting between counsel, their clients and a Salt
Lake detective. This meeting occurred just before the Petitioners'
3

pleas

were

entered

and

should

have

been

confidential.

The

Petitioners allege and testified they were threatened with charged
and uncharged offenses in the meeting, for which there had been no
discovery, by the detective and their counsel. Among other things,
the Petitioners testified they were induced to plead guilty because
they were told that they must plead to one first degree felony or
face life in prison because of these alleged offenses.
The Petitioners also claim that false promises were made in
this meeting that induced them to plead guilty.

Mr. Dean Hickman

claims and testified his attorney advised him to accept the plea
because of an agreement to not include a firearms enhancement as
part of his sentence.
proceeding
enhancement.

indicates

(Exhibit 1, p. 5).
that

Mr.

Hickman

(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3).

The evidence in this
received

a

firearm

The Petitioners also claim

they were falsely promised by their attorneys that the attorneys
would assist in parole hearings and the Petitioners would serve no
more than five years if only the Petitioners would plead guilty.
Further, the Petitioners claim and testified their pleas in
the District Court were not voluntary and of their own volition.
Both the Petitioners testified they were "coached" by their counsel
what to say at the taking of their pleas.

In some instances, what

they were told to say was wrong.
Both of the Petitioners testified that these errors resulted
in their pleas.

Both testified that but for these errors, they

would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.

Both testified they sought the assistance of counsel to
4

file motions

to withdraw and to appeal.

When their counsel

refused, the Petitioners proceeded "pro se."
Judge Rigtrup orally ruled from the bench at the conclusion of
the hearing, a copy of which is attached in Addendum "A."

In his

oral ruling Judge Rigtrup held that assuming the truth of all of
the allegations of the deficiencies of counsel, there had not been
a showing that the Petitioners would have insisted on going to
trial.

(Addendum "A," p.4).

Judge Rigtrup also orally stated that the claims regarding the
voluntariness of the Petitioners' pleas should have been brought
before the trial court when the Petitioners sought to withdraw
their pleas. Judge Rigtrup stated the Petitioners failed to timely
raise this issue.

(Addendum "A," p.3).

Judge Rigtrup finally found that the Petitioners did not meet
the second prong of the standard applied to determine if there is
constitutionally
guilty.

ineffective

counsel when there

is a plea of

The standard, formulated from Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985),
requires a defendant to show there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsels' errors, he or she would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
Utah Courts follow a very similar standard.
Court,

in Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d

The Utah Supreme

516, 521

(Utah 1994),

recently held that Strickland requires a defendant first show
counsel

rendered a deficient performance
5

in some demonstrable

manner, which performance
reasonable

professional

fell below an objective standard of

judgment

and,

second,

that

counsel's

performance prejudiced the defendant. Parsons v. Barnes, supra, at
521.
Judge Rigtrup formally entered very sparse Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and an Order on September 13, 1993.
attached in Addendum "B."

A copy is

In his Findings of Fact, Judge Rigtrup

found, inter alia, that no discovery had been shared with the
Petitioners

even

though

"some"

discovery

was

in

counsels'

possession and that a police detective was present during the
critical meeting between the Petitioners and their counsel.

Judge

Rigtrup found the Petitioners had moved to withdraw their pleas and
had appealed.

Judge Rigtrup then concluded, as a matter of law,

that the Petitioners failed to prove that absent counsels' errors,
they would have insisted upon going to trial.

Judge Rigtrup,

therefore, formally held that the Petitioners failed to meet the
prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, supra, and Hill v.
Lockhart, supra.
Judge Rigtrup's legal conclusions were not supported in the
record or by his sparse Findings of Fact.

The Petitioners both

testified and/or alleged they would not have entered guilty pleas
if their counsel had met

appropriate

standards of

reasonable

representation and they would have insisted on a trial.

More

particularly, both testified and/or alleged they would not have
pleaded guilty if their attorneys would have engaged in discovery
and consulted with them about the discovery.
6

In addition, both

testified and/or alleged they would not have pleaded guilty had
their attorneys not engaged in the coercive conduct at the critical
meeting or coached them at the time of their pleas. (R. at 231; R.
at 255) .

Finally, the Petitioners testified and/or alleged that

they sought the assistance of counsel in proceeding with motions to
withdraw and with their appeal, but the requests were denied.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On January 18, 1985, the Petitioners pleaded guilty to

aggravated robbery.

(Defendants' Exhibits 6 and 7).

At the time

of the pleas, Petitioner Dean Hickman was 20 years old and was a
tenth grade drop-out.

(R. at 221) . Petitioner Rick Hickman was 21

years old and had not completed the seventh grade.
2.

(R. at 246).

The pleas were originally taken in the Circuit Court at

a time scheduled for a preliminary hearing on a separate and
unrelated charge.

(R. at 193/ R. at 214/ R. at 222). During this

preliminary hearing, the Petitioners were taken into an adjoining
room for a meeting with counsel.

Their brother, who also was

arrested and pleaded guilty, was also taken into the room.1

(R.

at 190/ R. at 215/ R. at 240).
3.

A detective from the Salt Lake City Police Department

came into the room during the meeting.

(Id.) None of the brothers

understood who the detective was and they talked freely with their
1

The third brother, Boyd, had his guilty plea set aside in
1988.
(R. at 188). The State attempted to retry him on the
Information to which he pleaded guilty and failed. He was released
from custody in 1989 and has been a productive citizen since that
time.
7

lawyers

in

front

of

him.

The

detective

participate in confidential communications.
4.

was

permitted

to

(R. at 215-219).

The Petitioners were threatened in this meeting by the

detective and by counsel that if they did not immediately plead
guilty to a first degree felony having a penalty of five years to
life, they would be required to go to trial on several other
charges and uncharged offenses.

They were threatened that they

would spend the rest of their lives in prison.

(R. at 241-251).

In return for their pleas, the Petitioners were promised by their
counsel that the other charges would be dismissed, or not filed,
that counsel would appear at a parole hearing with them and that
they would spend just five years in prison.
5.

(Id.)

The Petitioners specifically requested counsel engage in

discovery in this meeting, including discovery on the charges that
were threatened if the Petitioners did not plead guilty.
Petitioners were told that, "It was not necessary."

The

(R. at 191; R.

at 219) .
6.

Consequently, the Petitioners were never apprised of the

evidence against them.

(R. at 220) .

The Petitioners did not

review any discovery with their attorneys. The Petitioners did not
discuss the evidence for the alleged crime to which they had
pleaded guilty with their attorneys.
7.
evidence

(R. at 220; R. at 245).

The Court file in the criminal proceedings contained no
of

Petitioners'

a discovery

demand

being

attorneys.

Mr. Rick

Hickman's

discoverable information in his file.
8

made by

either

attorney

(R. at 202) .

of

the

had

no

Mr. Dean

Hickman's attorney, who had informally been provided with "some"
discovery materials, did not show it to either Petitioner.

(R. at

220) .
8.

An expert witness, called on the Petitioners' behalf,

testified that a failure to file a discovery demand, to provide
discovery to a client and to discuss it with the client prior to a
plea would not be reasonable representation.
9.

(R. at 180-185).2

At the time of the pleas, neither Petitioner knew what

the evidence was for the crimes for which they were charged nor the
crimes with which they were threatened.

(R. at 224, 252).

The

first and only time the Petitioners were advised of the evidence
against them was during the course of discovery in this case by the
attorney appointed to represent them.
10.

(R. at 221).

When the Petitioners viewed the discovery, they learned

for the first time that the key witnesses the State intended to
call were alleged co-conspirators.

(Id.)

One had been provided

with full immunity to avoid prosecution.

Both the Petitioners

testified that if they had seen the discovery, they would not have
entered a plea of guilty.
11.

(R. at 231; R. at 255).

After the meeting with counsel and the detective, the

Petitioners pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court.

Petitioner Dean

Hickman did not hear from or see his counsel between the Circuit
2

Expert testimony elicited on the Petitioner's behalf was
from Larry Keller, Esq. Mr. Keller has practiced law for more than
twenty years and emphasizes criminal law in his practice. He is a
former Judge, having been appointed by the Honorable Scott
Matheson, is a former prosecutor and legal defender, and is a
former special prosecutor appointed by the Judges of the Third
District Court. (R. at 180-182).
9

Court appearance and the time of the taking of his plea in District
Court.

In the District Court, Mr. Dean Hickman was handed a plea

"affidavit" by his counsel which he had not seen and did not have
time to read.

(R. at 224) . When the Court asked him the questions

that accompany the taking of a plea, his attorney told him what to
say.

In Dean Hickman's

case, the

transcript

from

the plea

indicates there would not be a firearms enhancement.

(R. at 226) .

The

sentencing,

record

shows

that

years

after

the

plea

and

Petitioner Dean Hickman received a one line letter from his counsel
telling him there had been such an enhancement. (R. at 225-227;
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3 ) .
12.
counsel

Petitioner Rick Hickman also did not hear from or see his
between

appearance

in

the
the

time

of

District

the

Circuit

Court

for

Court

plea

arraignment,

and

his

plea

and

sentencing. At that time, counsel came into the courtroom late and
handed the plea affidavit to Petitioner Rick Hickman.

Mr. Rick

Hickman was not given the opportunity to read the affidavit and was
told by his counsel "to go with it."

The plea affidavit on its

face contained inaccurate information. (R. at 249).
13.

The Petitioners sought the assistance of counsel for

motions to withdraw their pleas, for their parole hearings and for
an appeal that was subsequently filed.

Despite the promises of

assistance, their counsel would not assist them.

10

Both were forced

to proceed "pro se."3

(R. at 227; R

at 288; R

at 250, R

at

251)
14

The trial court denied the motions to withdraw and the

Supreme Court rejected the appeal
(Utah 1989)

State v

Hickman, 779 P 2d 670

The focus of the motions and the appeal were the

elements of the crime charged.

(Id. at 671-672)

The Supreme

Court also examined whether the trial court's failure to ask if
Dean Hickman's plea was entered free from threats, promises or
inducements violated Rule 11 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
The Court indicated that the record showed Dean Hickman signed a
plea affidavit, which stated the plea was voluntary.

Importantly,

there is no discussion in the opinion on the statements or conduct
of counsel at the plea. Thus, there has not been a judicial review
of the question of whether the Petitioners received effective
assistance of counsel at the pleas.4

3

Dean Hickman's attorney testified she was certain she told
him that she would appear at the Board of Pardons.
At her
deposition, she looked through her files and messages, had no
recollection "of being contacted," "and therefore did not appear."
(Exhibit 1, page 9). Mr. Hickman testified he spoke with his
attorney and told her about the hearing but she refused to go. (R.
at 227) .
4

As noted, it seems that Judge Rigtrup refused to consider
the Petitioners' claims in this proceeding regarding the
voluntariness of the pleas. The formal Findings, however, are so
sparse that it is no clear. Judge Rigtrup orally commented that
the Petitioners should have raised their ineffective assistance of
counsel claim as it relates to voluntariness on their direct appeal
or their motion to withdraw their plea. As set forth below, there
is direct authority that would allow Judge Rigtrup or this Court to
hear these claims. See Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah
1989) .
11

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Petitioners met the standards set forth in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed. 203.

Both

testified that they would have insisted upon going to trial but for
counsels' errors with respect to discovery, the meeting and the
plea.

The testimony is not sufficiently contradicted in the record

to support Judge Rigtrup's legal conclusion. Moreover, the failure
of counsel to assist them in withdrawing their pleas and in the
appeal was prejudicial.

This is particularly

so because the

Petitioners,

legal

not

lacking

any

training,

did

raise

the

ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal, and the
trial court suggested, but did not formally conclude, that the
failure barred a review of the claims in this proceeding.

ARGUMENT
A.

The Petitioners Did Not Receive Effective
Assistance of Counsel.

The Petitioners in this case seek, by post conviction relief,
to have their guilty pleas to aggravated robbery withdrawn and
their convictions vacated.

The basis for the Petitioners' claims

is they were denied the effective assistance of counsel and would
have insisted on a trial absent counsels' errors.
The law is clear that a criminal defendant pleading guilty to
a

felony

charge

has a constitutional

right

to the

effective

assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
S.Ct. 7052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) sets forth the two prong standard
12

which

must

Amendment
right.

be

of

Id.

Fourteenth

applied.

the

United

The

right,

States

guaranteed

Constitution,

by

is a

the

Sixth

fundamental

It is guaranteed to a State defendant through the
Amendment

of

the

United

States

Constitution.

See

Parsons v. Barnes, supra, at 522; Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547
(Utah 1989); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186-87

(Utah 1990);

State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1993) .
To

prevail

counsels'

on

their

performance

claims,

fell

below

the
an

Petitioners
objective

must

standard

show
of

reasonableness and must establish, but for counsels' unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984) .
In

appeals

this

Court

should

defer

to

the

trial

court's

findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous; however, both
the performance and prejudice standards are mixed questions of law
and subject to de novo review.

Id. at 698, 104 S.Ct. 2070.

Although Strickland is often cited, it offers very important
advice that bears repeating.

In Strickland, the Court reviewed the

development of the law regarding effective assistance of counsel.
466

U.S.

at

684.

The

importance of effective

Court,
counsel

recognizing

the

constitutional

in every case, emphasized

that

counsel's function is to assist the defendant and to advocate the
client's cause.

Id. at 688.

The Court stressed the "particular"

duties of "consult[ing] with the defendant on important decisions,"
"keep[ing] the defendant informed of important developments" and
13

bringing to bear such "skill and knowledge as will render the trial
a reliable adversarial testing process."
Under

Strickland

a

reviewing

id.

court

defers

to

counsel's

performance, particularly on decisions of trial strategy.

But

"counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable
unnecessary."

decision

that

makes

466 U.S. at 691.

particular

investigations

If counsel fails to fulfill these

duties and it is prejudicial to the defense, it will constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims apply directly to
pretrial procedures, including advice regarding guilty pleas. The
United

States Supreme Court addressed effective

assistance of

counsel in the setting of a guilty plea in Hill v. Lockart, 474
U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d. 203 (1985).
employed the two prong Strickland test.
the Strickland test remains the same.

In Hill, the Court

The performance prong of
In Hill, the Court stated,

"where...a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea
process, and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the
voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice was
within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases."

id. at 56 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771

(1970)) .
The prejudice prong for a guilty plea focuses on:
Whether counsel's constitutionally
ineffective
performance affected the outcome of the plea process. In
other words, in order to satisfy the "prejudice"
requirement, the defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he
14

would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial.
Id at 59.
In this case, the Petitioners have met the second prong of the
Strickland and Hill tests.

The Petitioners explicitly alleged

and/or testified they would have withdrawn their pleas had their
counsel engaged

in discovery and disclosed

the nature of the

discovery against them, had their counsel refrained from threats
and provided accurate and not erroneous advice on the sentencing
and parole process, and had their counsel not permitted a detective
to

participate

in

plea

communications occurred.

discussions

where

confidential

Hill v. Lockart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106

S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).5
B. The Petitioners Demonstrated They Would Not Have
Pleaded Guilty Had Counsel Engaged in and Shared Discovery.
Both the Petitioners unequivocally testified they would not
have gone to trial had they been aware of the evidence obtainable
in discovery (particularly being made aware that the State's prime
witness was a co-conspirator who had been provided with immunity)
and had they not been told that they would be assisted at parole
hearings and would spend no more than five years in prison.

The

Petitioners' testimony as to their willingness to go to trial is
not contradicted by evidence in the record.

There was no clear

factual basis for the trial court's conclusion that the Petitioners
5

Judge Rigtrup even recognized that this was an unusual case
because no discovery motion had been filed, that "some" discovery
had been made available but not shared, and that there was a
substantial basis for attacking the credibility of the State's
witnesses. (Addendum A.)
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failed to prove that absent counsels' errors they "would have
insisted upon going to trial."6
Errors like the ones committed by counsel have caused other
courts to find ineffective assistance.

For example, the U.S.

Supreme Court has held that counsel's failure to file discovery
motions can amount to deficient performance.

In Kimmelman v.

Morrison, 474 U.S. 365, 88 L.Ed. 2d. 203, 106 S. Ct. 366 (1985), the
Court addressed a defendant's claim that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance when he failed to file a discovery request
that

would

evidence.

have

revealed

a basis

to

challenge

incriminating

The Court noted that counsel's failure was not based on

"strategy," but on the mistaken belief that the State was obliged
to turn over inculpatory evidence.

The Court remanded for an

evidentiary hearing to determine prejudice. To show prejudice, the
Court indicated that defendant would have to show the outcome of
his trial would be different.

Id. at 391.

In this case the failure to conduct discovery and to share it
with the Petitioners was critical.

This was not "strategy."

It

was deficient performance under the circumstances.

As noted, the

Petitioners

case

produced

expert

testimony

in

this

that

a

reasonable attorney would conduct formal discovery and share the

6

Judge Rigtrup's comments from the bench indicate he was not
persuaded that the Petitioners would have gone to trial because of
the existence of other threatened charges and a probation violation
hearing at the time of the pleas.
(Addendum "A," at 3 ) . Judge
Rigtrup, in effect, assumes the Petitioners would not have gone to
trial. The record does not indicate the Petitioners would not have
gone to trial for these reasons and their testimony is just
opposite.
16

discovery with the client. Had discovery been done and shared, the
Petitioners

would

have

known

the

State's

key

witnesses

were

purported Mco-conspirators" that had been provided with immunity.
Their testimony and credibility should have been subjected to the
"reliable adversarial testimony process" that Strickland recognized
was

so important

for effective

counsel

to employ.

Both the

Petitioners testified that had they been aware the State's key
witnesses were purported co-conspirators, they would have gone to
trial, and it was prejudicial for this to not occur.7
C. The Petitioners Would Not Have Pleaded Guilty Had
Counsel Not Made Threats and Allowed a Detective to
Participate in Key Plea Negotiations.
Similarly, counsel were constitutionally ineffective when they
permitted the detective on the case to be present and participate
in the coercive meeting that lead to the pleas.

Joint discussions

involving criminal defendants and their counsel where strategy,
facts and defenses are discussed are tenuous.

There are obvious

problems of confidentiality. There are problems protecting against
incriminating statements. When the State is present, as it was in
this case, these problems become insurmountable. At a minimum, the
State learns the strengths and weaknesses of the defense.

The

effectiveness of counsel in a trial or in negotiating a plea
7

Judge Rigtrup's finding that the Petitioners' counsel had
"some" discovery illustrates the importance of a discovery motion
and the sharing of materials with a criminal defendant. Without a
demand, the prosecution need not provide all discoverable
materials. This is not a case where there was an open file policy
and the court ruled the Petitioners received all the materials to
which they were entitled. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 525
(Utah 1994) (failure to file discovery not prejudicial when there
was an "open file policy" and no prejudice shown).
17

bargain is significantly reduced, if not eliminated.8

After such

a meeting, there is likely no available alternative except to enter
a plea.
but

The Petitioners claim they would not have entered a plea

for counsel

allowing

the detective

to be present

in the

meeting.
Similarly, the coercive statements made by the detective and
by counsel to cause the Petitioners to enter their pleas constitute
ineffective assistance.

Judge Rigtrup found the Petitioners were

told there was substantial evidence against them.

They were not

told, however, what the key evidence was or that it primarily
consisted of the testimony of co-conspirators.

The Petitioners

were also told of other uncharged offenses, but were rebuffed when
they asked for discovery to be accomplished on the other alleged
cases.9
Instead of conducting discovery and properly informing the
Petitioners, counsel erroneously promised the Petitioners would
only serve five years for a guilty plea.

The Petitioners were

assured of this because their attorneys were going to assist them
in the parole process.

The Petitioners based their decision to

plead on this advice and assurance.
8

Although the evidence showed that the detective was present
during some of the meeting, and Judge Rigtrup so found, the
attorney for Mr. Rick Hickman could not recall if the detective was
present.
The attorney agreed, however, that the presence of a
detective "would be totally improper." (R. at 202).
9

The best indicator of the legitimacy of the other cases is
Boyd Hickman's case.
After he withdrew his plea, the State
attempted to retry Boyd Hickman on the very same Information. Mr.
Hickman was found "not guilty" and was immediately released by the
Court.
18

In fact, the record in this case indicates, at least for Dean
Hickman, that there was a firearms enhancement which would mean
Dean Hickman was never eligible for a five year sentence.
Code Ann. §76-3-203

(1953, as amended).10

Utah

The record also shows

that despite the promises of counsel, they were not assisted in the
parole process.

Thus, the very keys to the decision to enter a

plea of guilty, upon which the Petitioners relied in making their
decision, were not true.
This case is like Garmon v. Lockhart, 938 F.2d 120 (8th Cir.
1991) . In Garmon, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals found that a
criminal defendant met both prongs of Strickland where his counsel
gave him erroneous information on which he based his decision to
plead guilty. The Court affirmed the district court's holding that
the defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel. The
Court dismissed, as this Court should, the contention that because
the defendant risked a longer prison term if he went to trial, the
defendant would not be prejudiced by the erroneous advice.

The

Court relied on the defendant's testimony that he would have risked
the longer sentence had he been aware that he would have been
eligible for parole in fifteen, not five years.

10

See also U.S. v.

There is a dispute between counsel and the Petitioners on
whether they were told they would serve only five years or "five
years to life." There is no dispute, however, that even if it was
"five years to life," the advice was wrong for Dean Hickman because
of the enhancement.
19

Loughay, 908 F.2d

1014

(D.C.Cir. 1990)

(ineffective assistance

focused on failure to be aware of the law) .1X
Moreover, counsels' conduct prior to and at the time the pleas
were entered in the District Court only served to compound the
problems.

The Petitioners were young and not educated.

The

threats that were made caused them to enter the pleas in Circuit
Court.

Then their counsel did not communicate with them prior to

the taking of the pleas in District Court. The Petitioners did not
have the time to read the plea affidavits which they ultimately
signed

(but did not fill out) and, in haste, the Petitioners'

counsel "coached" them as to what to say.
Judge Rigtrup further erred to the extent the formal Findings
do not address the issues regarding counsels' threats and conduct
at the pleas.

Judge Rigtrup only found that the Petitioners filed

a motion to withdraw which the Supreme Court affirmed.

Judge

Rigtrup made no legal conclusion except that Petitioners failed to
show prejudice (Addendum "A").
If Judge Rigtrup's

formal Findings are read to find the

Petitioners were barred from making these claims, Judge Rigtrup was
wrong.

The Motion to Withdraw and appeal were pursued "pro se."

The Petitioners, lacking any training in the law, sought the
assistance of their counsel in the filing of the motions and in the

11

Counsel for Dean Hickman admitted she likely told him that
she would appear at the parole board, but was never advised of the
time it was scheduled. Mr. Hickman testified he personally told
her. It would seem obvious that once counsel advised a client that
they would assist, they would be certain they knew when the parole
hearing occurred and would fulfill his or her promise.
20

appeals.

They were told assistance would not be provided.

The

Petitioners did not raise the "effective" assistance of counsel
claim because they were uninformed and alone in the process.
Judge Rigtrup wrongly concluded the Petitioners were barred in
these circumstances.

It is well established that such claims

regarding ineffective assistance may be considered for the first
time on a petition for extraordinary relief.
844 P.2d 315

Gerrish v. Barnes,

(Utah 1992); Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549

(Utah 1989); Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d

1029, 1035

(Utah 1989).

Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has frequently resolved issues
asserted in petitions for post conviction relief even though the
issues raised were known or should have been known. Hurst v. Cook,
supra at 1036.
In the Petition in this case, the Petitioners claimed they
were denied the effective assistance of counsel at the time of
their motions to withdraw and appeal.

They requested but did not

receive the assistance of their attorneys even though Utah law,
Utah Code Ann. §77-32-3 and United States Supreme Court precedent,
Donald v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 9 L.Ed. 2d. 811, 83 S.Ct. 814
(1963), allows for counsel on appeal.
In the case of Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah
1989) , the Court held that an inmate whose allegedly ineffective
trial counsel also represented him in direct appeal was not barred
from

using

claims

of

habeas

corpus

to

raise

the

claim

of

ineffective assistance of counsel when such claim was not raised on
appeal.

The court stated, "the Sixth Amendment right to effective
21

assistance of counsel is impelled if an alleged violation of that
right cannot be raised for the first time in a habeas corpus
proceeding

when

the

allegedly

ineffective

trial

counsel

also

represented the defendant on appeal and failed to raise the issue
at that stage."
In this

id. at 550.

case, the

Petitioners

were

denied

the

right

to

effective assistance of counsel to represent them. They sought the
assistance of their counsel for the Motion to Withdraw and for the
appeal.

This is much like Fernandez.

The Petitioners' failure to

raise the issue should not defeat the claims of ineffective counsel
when the claim is that counsels' failure to assist in the appeal
was constitutionally ineffective. The failure to raise ineffective
counsel by unskilled and unknowing defendants (now the Petitioners)
who did not want

to but proceeded

"pro se" should

not

have

precluded the trial court and should not preclude this Court from
examining the merits of the claim.

22

CONCLUSION
The Petitioners have shown counsel committed errors, and but
for

those

errors

they would have

insisted

on a trial.

Petitioners have met the standards of Strickland and Hill.

The
The

Petitioners respectfully request the Court reverse the trial court,
permit

them

to withdraw

their guilty pleas

and vacate

their

sentences.
DATED this 2 2 _ _

da

Y

of

December, 1994.

APPEL & MATTSSON

'James L. Warlaumont

~^Z> T~i ~Y^7/?

Attorney for Petitioners /IMdiM^
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*

i

4

*

*

DEAN K. HICKMAN,
RICK K. HICKMAN,

5
Plaintiffs,
5
7
9

Case No. 923902029

-vsTAMARA HOLDEN,
FRED VAN DER VEUR,
Defendants .

JUDGE KENNETH RIGTRUP

9
0
1

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 28th, 1993,

2

at 10:00 o'clock a.m., this cause came on for hearing

3

before the HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, District Court,

4

without a jury in the Salt Lake County Courthouse,

5

Salt Lake City, Utah.

7

A P P E A R A N C E S

3
4

For the Plaintiffs

ANDREA C. ALCABES
Attorney at Law

For the Defendants

ANGELA F. MICKLOS
Attorney at Law

CAT by:

CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, RPR

1

P R O

2

C--E--F D--T M -g.-q

THE COURT:

It's striking

3

that the Petitioners, according

4

met for an hour and a half.

5

Court has before

6

to the Court

to Dean's

testimony,

The positive details

it leave a lot to be desired.

The Court has no substantial

doubt,

7

based upon Mr. Garcia's testimony, that Officer

8

came

9

that was going on.

in at least

the

Bell

in the latter part of the meeting
And

the Court recognizes

that the

10

plea negotiations were taking place very early on.

11

don't think I can remember

12

level of court, where the Legal Defenders' Office

13

involved

14

the discovery

15

a routine practice of that office.

16

this level at the time they entertained

17

negotiations.

I

a file that gets to this
is

and files a formal written appearance, that
request

is not

in the file.

It is just

They weren't at
the plea

The Court has no doubt from all of the

18
19

evidence that M s . Wells did have in her

possession

20

some discovery materials.

21

Court that at least she, in a conclusory

22

advised

23

evidence against them.

24

that one of the witnesses against ihem, or two of the

25

potential witnesses against them, were

There's no doubt to the

the Defendants that there was

sort of way,

substantial

It's clear from this evidence

2

And although that f s a substantial

1

co-conspirators.

2

basis for attacking credibility at trial, the

3

Defendants had a pending order to show cause

4

proceeding pending before Judge Banks.

5

talking about the potentiality of a habitual criminal

6

charge against them, they had to have at least a one

7

- - a second degree felony conviction, with the

8

potential of being convicted on at least a second

9

degree felony in the case before the Court; and the

For them to be

10

the pending potential of other charges being made

11

against them.

12

The case concerning the voluntariness of

13

the plea agreement was considered before Daniels.

14

was appealed.

15

whether they were intimidated or threatened and

16

coerced to enter the plea which was considered by

17

Judge Daniels and was considered by the Utah Supreme

18

Court on appeal.

19

raise that, and they failed to do so.

20

It

And, certainly, they knew at that point

They had an obligation to timely

The Court simply is not persuaded from

21

the record before it, given that context, that the

22

errors of counsel —

23

clear from the record that the physical discovery

24

materials that Brooke Wells had were not shared.

25

clear to the Court that, other than in a conclusory

and the Court does feel that it's

3

It's

1

way, she didn't discuss those apparently with great

2

specificity.

3

hearing

4

allegations of the defectiveness of representation

5

counsel or ineffective assistance of c o u n s e l , that

6

they would have insisted

7

been bound over to the District

8
i

However, there's been no showing

as to -- assuming

in this

the truth o<! all of the

on going to trial having

of

once

Court.

And the Court finds and concludes

the

second prong of the Hi-li and Strixrk i'an-d cases have not

10

been met; accordingly, the Petition

11

We will be in r e c e s s .

12
13
14
15

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
4

is denied.
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JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
ANGELA F. MICKLOS (6229)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
DEAN K. HICKMAN,
RICK K. HICKMAN,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER

Petitioners,
TAMARA HOLDEN,
FRED VAN DER VEUR,

Case No.

Respondents.

920902029 HC

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Petitioners' petition for habeas corpus or post-conviction
relief came before the court for an evidentiary hearing July 27 and
28, 1993, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup presiding.
were

present

Respondents

and

were

were

represented

represented

by

by Angela

Andrea
F.

Petitioners
C.

Alcabes.

Micklos, Assistant

Attorney General. After hearing testimony, receiving evidence, and
hearing arguments of counsel, the Court, being fully advised, now
enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On

January

aggravated robbery.

18,

1985,

Petitioners

pled

guilty

to

2.

Petitioner Dean Hickman was represented by Brooke Wells.

Petitioner Rick Hickman was represented by Manny Garcia.
3.

On or about December 15, 1984, petitioners met with their

attorneys in a room in the circuit court building to discuss the
charges against them.
4.
Department

Detective

Don

Bell

of

the

Salt

Lake

City

Police

came in at least during the latter portion of the

meeting between petitioners and their attorneys.
5.

Brooke Wells had some discovery materials relating to the

aggravated robbery charges.
6.
with

Ms. Wells neither shared the physical discovery materials

petitioners,

specificity.

nor

discussed

their

content

with

great

However, she did advise petitioners, at least in a

conclusory manner, that there was substantial evidence against
them.
7.

Two of the prosecution's potential witnesses were co-

conspirators .
8.

Petitioners had a pending order to show cause proceeding

pending before Judge Banks.
9.

In 1988, petitioners filed a motion to withdraw their

pleas", which Judge Daniels denied.
10.

The

Utah

Supreme

Court

petitioners1 motion.
2

affirmed

the

denial

of

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Even

if

all

of

petitioners'

allegations

regarding

counsels' deficiencies are true, petitioners failed to prove that
absent counsels' errors, they would have insisted upon going to
trial.
2.

Petitioners failed to meet the prejudice prong necessary

to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, as stated in
Strickland

v.

Washington,

466

U.S.

668

(1984),

and

Hill

v.

Lockhart. 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
ORDER
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, and good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED as follows:

The petition for habeas corpus or post-

conviction relief is denied.
DATED this

13 -^day of

H£)NOR&BLE KENKET;
Third District Cdfort
Approved as to form:

/s/
ANDREA C. ALCABES
Attorney for petitioners

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby

certify

that

a

true

and

accurate

copy

of

the

foregoing unsigned FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
was mailed, postage prepaid, this

^ T d a y of August,

1993 to:

Andrea C. Alcabes, Esq.
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY
136 South Main Street, Suite 910
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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